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POINT I 
THE OCTOBER 8f 1981 ORDER DISCHARGING ZIONS AS PERSONAL 
REPRESENTATIVE OF THE JEROME B. PEPPER ESTATE DOES NOT BAR 
SUBSEQUENT CLAIMS AGAINST ZIONS FOR BREACH OF ITS FIDUCIARY DUTIES 
AS TRUSTEE OF THE JEROME B. PEPPER INTER VIVOS TRUST. 
The relevant facts in this matter are as stated in 
plaintiff's Brief dated November 12, 1985. Defendant's Brief 
dated January 15f 1986 gives the Court a detailed history of the 
litigation between the parties to this matter concerning the 
validity of the Probate Court's October 8, 1981 Order. That 
litigation has no bearing on the issues before the Court on this 
appeal. For purposes of this appeal, plaintiffs do not question 
the validity of the October 8f 1981 Order. They merely question 
the scope of that Order's preclusive effect. Plaintiffs contend 
that the October 8, 1981 Order does not bar either claims for 
fraud against the personal representative of the Jerome 3. Pepper 
estate or any claims against the trustee of the Jerome B. Pepper 
inter vivos trust. This Reply Brief is limited to discussion of 
plaintiffs1 right to assert claims against the trustee in spite of 
the October 8r 1981 Order. 
Pike v. Markham, 633 P.2d 944 (Wyo. 1981), is the only 
modern authority Zions cites to support its argument that 
plaintiffs1 claim against the trustee is barred. Pike is not on 
point. There, the court determined only that certain claims 
against the executors of an estate did not survive a decree of 
final settlement in connection with that estate. Plaintiffs in 
Pike asserted no separate claims against a trustee such as those 
at issue in this case. They characterize their suit as an action 
"to recover damages based primarily upon a breach of fiduciary 
duty, negligence, malfeasance and misfeasance in the office of the 
executor." Id. at 945 (emphasis added). The court in Pike noted 
that "the claims in this case were made against the executors." 
Id. at 947 (emphasis added). Thus, the court in Pike never had 
occasion to address the issue this appeal presents: Does the 
liability of the trustee of an existing inter vivos trust for 
failure to pursue a claim against itself as personal represent-
ative survive an order discharging the personal representative? 
Aside from its misleading attempts to bolster the feeble 
authority which supports its position, Zions makes three arguments 
on behalf of the lower court's ruling that plaintiffs1 claims 
against the trustee are barred. First, that the trustee's 
liability depends on a determination that the personal represent-
ative breached its duties to plaintiffs and that such a determi-
nation would be inconsistent with the order discharging the 
personal representative. Second, that plaintiffs' claims aaainst 
the trustee are barred because plaintiffs could have litigated 
those claims in the proceeding that led to the October 8, 1981 
Order. Finally, that certain policy considerations make it 
desirable to bar plaintiffs's claims against the trustee. 
Zions first argument relies on the concept of issue 
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preclusion. As plaintiffs's Brief has already shown, an order 
that results from an uncontested proceedinq cannot give rise to 
any issue preclusion. Zions first argument is therefore 
groundless. 
Zions second argument is a forced attempt to make claim 
preclusion applicable to this case. If Zions could establish that 
plaintiffs could have asserted their claims against the trustee in 
the probate proceedings, claim preclusion might apply to bar those 
claims. Thus Zions argues that plaintiffs knew in advance of the 
hearing on the personal representative's petition for discharge 
that the trustee concurred with that petition. Zions would have 
the Court believe that plaintiffs could therefore have pressed 
their claim against the trustee for dereliction of its duty to 
object to the personal representative's petition at the hearing on 
that petition. This is nonsense. 
Plaintiffs claim against the trustee for permitting entry 
of the October 8, 1981 Order accrued, like any other claim, when 
plaintiffs were injured. Zions failure to perform its trust did 
no injury until the court entered the October 8, 1981 Order which 
arguably barred certain claims. Plaintiffs may have had reason to 
believe that Zions had breached its trust before any injury 
occurred. But knowledge of a breach of duty does not make a cause 
of action by itself. A pedestrian has no cause of action against 
a motorist merely because the motorist drives in a negligent 
manner. The pedestrian only has a cause of action when the 
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motorist1s negligence causes him some injury. 
Plaintiffs1 claim against the trustee is for the trustee's 
breach of its contractual duty to object to the personal represent-
ative's final accounting. Zions argument is essentially that the 
trustee repudiated that duty before entry of the October 8, 1981 
Order, and that plaintiffs should have made their claim against 
the trustee as soon as it made the repudiation clear. The trustee 
was hired and paid to protect the plaintiffs. It is ridiculous to 
argue that the plaintiffs should have anticipated that their paid 
protector would violate its trust. 
Moreover, normally a suit for breach of contract is only 
appropriate when one party fails to perform a contractual duty as 
it falls due. See 17A C.J.S., Contracts §532 at 1027 ("[A]s a 
rule an action on a contract commenced before the time of 
performance arrives is premature."). The trustee's duty to object 
to the final accounting could not fall due until it first had an 
opportunity to object. Its first opportunity to object formally 
was in connection with the hearing on the personal representative's 
final accounting. 
Under certain circumstances, the doctrine of anticipatory 
breach does permit a suit for breach of contract as soon as the 
breaching party repudiates its contractual obligation. For 
several reasons, however, that doctrine does nothing to support 
Zions position. 
First, a repudiation must be clear and unequivocal to 
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support a suit for anticipatory breach. See Covington Brothers 
v. Valley Plastering, Inc., 566 P.2d 814 (Nev. 1977) ("A 
contractual anticipatory repudiation must be clear, positive, and 
unequivocal.")* The trustee's silent acquiesence does not 
constitute a clear, unequivocal repudiation. Second, there can be 
no anticipatory breach of a unilateral contract. See Sethre v. 
Washington Education Assn., 591 P.2d 838 (Wash. 1979); Greguhn v. 
Mutual of Omaha Insurance Co., 461 P.2d 285, 23 Utah 2d 214 
(1969); 11 S. Williston, Contracts, §1326 at 146 (3d ed. 1968). 
Since the trustee owed plaintiffs a duty and plaintiffs had no 
corresponding duty to the trustee, their relationship is closely 
analagous to a unilateral contract. Finally, an anticipatory 
breach gives the aggrieved party an option to sue immediately, it 
does not require him to do so. He may ignore the repudiation 
without prejudicing his rights. See Taylor v. Johnston, 539 P.2d 
425, 123 Cal. Reptr. 641 (1975). 
In its attempt to argue that claim preclusion bars 
plaintiffs' claims against the trustee, Zions relies heavily on 
the trustee's presence before the Probate Court as a party to the 
personal representative's petition. Zions does not, however, 
explain why the trustee's presence before the court should change 
the preclusive effect of the court's Order. Plaintiffs could not 
have asserted their claim against the trustee for permitting entry 
of the October 8, 1981 Order in the proceedings that led to that 
Order. That Order cannot therefore bar their claim, regardless of 
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who was a party to those proceedings. 
Zions final argument, that policy considerations should 
lead the Court to hold plaintiffs' claims against the trustee 
barred, is irrevelant. Every defendant could present any number 
of reasons why the public would be served if he were sheltered 
from liability. Such arguments have nothing to do with the 
applicability of res judicata. Res judicata cannot bar 
plaintiffs' claims against the trustee just because Zions thinks 
such a result would be a good thing. The only policy concerns 
relevant to this appeal are those which underly res judicata. 
That doctrine is aimed at preventing multiple litigation of the 
same claim. Its goal would not be furthered by a ruling that 
plaintiffs' claims against the trustee are barred. 
CONCLUSION 
There is no basis for holding that plaintiffs' claims 
against the trustee are barred. This Court should therefore 
reverse the lower court's order dismissing those claims. 
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this 31st day of March, 1986. 
BIELE, HASLAM & HATCH 
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